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Repairing the American Image, 
One Tweet at a Time
Robert Kelley 
For nearly all of the Bush administration, America’s standing in most parts of the world remained dismally low. The reputation it left behind after 2008 stood ready for a dramatic 
overhaul with the arrival of the popular Barack Obama. Beginning almost immediately with 
a positive new message offered to the Muslim world, Obama’s public diplomacy is decidedly 
less notable for its substantive achievements than the strides he and Secretary Hillary Clinton 
have made in modernising the means of public diplomatic discourse. During its time in 
office the Obama administration has worked to broaden and accelerate communications 
with audiences abroad by inserting social media and technology exchanges into the toolkit 
of the public diplomat. Yet the administration’s tendency toward strategic incoherence 
means public diplomacy strategy remains a mystery. As the content of public diplomacy falls 
behind innovations in methods to deliver it, one has to wonder: what is the world hearing? 
When George W. Bush and company departed from the White House on that cold day in January 2009, 
a quick check of the national inventory revealed debt – and more debt – at almost every turn. In eight 
years as president, Bush nearly doubled the national debt to almost $11 trillion. The unemployment rate 
he inherited in 2001 – 4.2 percent – surged in 2008 after that summer’s shakeup in financial markets 
propelled it to 7.8 percent by the next inauguration. As one of his final acts as president, Bush and his 
beleaguered treasury secretary Henry Paulson orchestrated an unpopular bank bailout of $700 billion. 
Finally, one cannot overlook the steep price of post-9/11 security strategy, including the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, amounting to $846 billion. With so much money on the move, it should surprise no one 
that the first and possibly the only term of Barack Obama finds a president desperate for financial capital. 
And this does not mean the bankrolling of his ambitious health care legislation or European–influenced 
high-speed rail network. As evidenced by last summer’s debt ceiling debacle and repeated threats to 
shut down the federal government, this president is just trying to keep the lights on. 
Of course, aside from financial capital there are other accounts available to a leader. Consider political 
capital: a currency that is valued in data produced not by financial institutions but by polling firms. 
Sometimes a leader will say defiantly that they do not pay attention to polls. They are lying. These 
indicators tell leaders the strength of their mandate, their popularity, and the likelihood that their publics 
will accept the agenda laid out before them. Crucially, and much like their financial brethren, these data 
also tell leaders the point at which their account will be overdrawn. In the aftermath of his 2004 re-
election victory, Bush famously remarked, ‘I earned capital in the campaign, political capital. And now 
I intend to spend it’. He did to exhaustion, leaving office with the lowest approval rating since Richard 
Nixon. Heaped atop this mountain of financial burdens, Bush would leave to Obama another account 
of political capital in dire circumstances: foreign public opinion of the United States. 
36
With remarkably few exceptions, key constituencies 
around the world diminished their affections for 
America during the Bush years. According to the Pew 
Global Attitudes Project, respondents to annual surveys 
of favourability towards America in neighbouring 
Mexico and Canada registered declines of 12 and 
16 percent, respectively, between 2000 and 2007. 
Important regional ally and trade partner Japan 
reported a similar drop over that time. Sentiments in 
Turkey plummeted sharply by 41 percent as opposition 
to American foreign policy spread all around the 
Middle East. An unsettling finding of Moroccans, 
Jordanians, and Pakistanis in 2003 showed much 
more confidence in Osama bin Laden to ‘do the right 
thing in the world’ than Bush. Meanwhile, in Europe 
the average favourability rating towards America by 
Brits, French, Germans, and Spaniards fell by nearly 
30 percent over seven years. When the Transatlantic 
Trends survey of European Union member states began 
in 2002, only 31 percent of respondents found US 
leadership in the world ‘undesirable’. By 2008, that 
number would increase to 59 percent.  
The world inherited by Obama depicted deep distrust 
among traditional allies and even deeper hostility 
from a growing list of adversaries. But, because most 
Americans could easily marginalise matters of foreign 
import, few felt the severity of this debt of political 
capital as profoundly as its public diplomats. First came 
the criticisms. The late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke 
was first to wonder in October 2001 how a ‘man in a 
cave’ could outflank the communications superiority of 
the United States. To the delight of no one in the US 
government, this lamentation resurfaced on numerous 
occasions over several years, most recently in late 
2007 when then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
declared ‘It’s just plain embarrassing that al-Qaeda is 
better at communicating its message on the internet 
than America’. In the interim, well over thirty research 
efforts were undertaken to call attention to the flaws 
and propose fixes for American public diplomacy. Then 
came the revolving door. The Bush years saw a steady 
stream of public diplomacy undersecretaries propose, 
attempt, and abandon their initiatives. Charlotte 
Beers’s ‘Shared Values’ campaign, one that injected 
private-sector public relations glitz into statecraft, 
and won an endorsement from then-Secretary of 
State Colin Powell. The same could not be said for 
al-Jazeera and the state broadcasting agencies of Egypt 
and Lebanon, and the project collapsed in early 2003. 
Bush loyalist Karen Hughes attempted a self-styled 
‘listening tour’ of the Middle East, which in the end 
seemed to produce more talking than listening. Finally, 
James Glassman gained some much-needed traction 
with the social network-driven ‘public diplomacy 2.0’, 
only to be sent packing by the new administration 
after six months on the job. 
Evidence from elsewhere suggested the failures in 
public diplomacy had less to do with strategy or 
direction and more to do with the futility of explaining 
unpopular policies to the world. This realisation found 
daylight in the 2008 presidential campaign when the 
Chicago Council on Global Affairs reported that 83 
percent of the electorate regarded America’s standing 
abroad as a high priority issue. Policy and strategy 
changes notwithstanding, there was one adjustment 
all could agree would go over well internationally: a 
change in leadership. As predicted, the Obama victory 
breathed new life into the United States’ reputation. 
And so, with respect to public diplomacy the new 
administration found three options at its disposal: 
change strategy, change policy, or ride the coat-tails 
of the reputational saviour. In Barack Obama’s first 
term, all of the above took place to some degree, 
though some more than others. 
A useful guide outlining the likely public diplomacy 
priorities for the new administration appeared in the 
edited volume titled Change for America, a ‘progressive 
blueprint’ brimming with ideas from the liberal 
intelligentsia, including Tom Donilon, Elena Kagan, 
John Podesta, and Laura Tyson. Douglas Wilson, now 
directing the Pentagon’s Public Affairs Office, set 
forth five goals for Obama’s public diplomacy: 1) 
recruiting top-notch talent; 2) affording them the 
credibility necessary to be effective; 3) integrating 
public diplomats into the foreign policy decision-
making process; 4) expanding the use of internet-
based communications tools; and 5) maximising these 
tools within the existing structure of educational, 
cultural, and leadership development programs. Put 
more succinctly, the administration’s public diplomacy 
objectives were made clear for the new Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton: choose the right people to 
conduct it, give them a strategy and policy positions 
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they can work with, and give them the tools they need 
to succeed. Fulfillment of the first objective came in 
May 2009 with the confirmation of media executive 
and Clinton ally Judith McHale as Under Secretary 
of Public Diplomacy. A relative unknown within the 
public diplomacy circuit, reaction ranged from muted 
to negative. It took McHale nearly a year to unveil her 
decidedly disappointing public diplomacy strategy, 
heavy on vaguely worded imperatives such as ‘shape 
the narrative’ and ‘combat violent extremism’ but 
lacking a clearly articulated vision. 
As it happened, that articulation would come from 
elsewhere. Early in her tenure, Secretary Clinton 
unveiled plans to transform the role of the Department 
of State both within the US government and in the 
wider world. In one of her first acts as Secretary, 
Clinton nominated Princeton scholar Anne-Marie 
Slaughter to be Director of Policy Planning. Slaughter, 
best known for her forward-thinking book A 
New World Order, would inject her work into the 
production of an equally transformational document 
for the government’s principal non-military foreign 
affairs agencies. By design, the resulting Quadrennial 
Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) for the 
first time placed the Department of State and the US 
Agency for International Development on level ground, 
asserting the success of one to be inextricably linked 
to that of the other. Months later Clinton unveiled 
the ‘21st Century Statecraft’ vision statement, echoing 
Obama’s campaign promise of ‘open government’ and 
purporting to exceed the wildest dreams of Wilson’s 
Fourteen Points. For the notoriously technology-allergic 
Department, it signalled new enthusiasm for social 
media such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. By 
extension, it also acknowledged the arrival of an age 
when citizens could play ambassadors and diplomats 
could behave like citizens, provided, of course, the 
necessary tools were available to all of them. The 
launch of ‘21st Century Statecraft’ marked a beginning 
in State’s bold transition away from confidentiality and 
late adoption and toward openness and promotion of 
information communication technologies. 
The technology dividend for public diplomacy meant 
strengthening of the bridge between the public’s 
ability to communicate and government’s ability 
to respond. In a role reminiscent of the surrogate 
broadcasters of the Cold War, the State Department 
once again found itself actively enabling freedom of 
information in restricted spaces. One famous instance 
of this occurred during the popular uprisings in the 
aftermath of the 2009 Iranian election, when Twitter 
was first seen as a staple of dissent. When scheduled 
maintenance threatened to take Twitter offline for a 
few precious hours during the revolt, a timely call from 
the State Department persuaded the company to delay 
it. American diplomats served as brokers between 
technology providers and tech-hungry populations. 
Technology delegations, or ‘techdels’, have travelled 
to Mexico and, in the response to violence erupting 
from its large-scale counternarcotics campaign, launch 
a text message system for citizens to report crimes 
anonymously. In the area of disaster relief, short code 
systems set up to receive charitable donations by text 
message for refugees from the Swat Valley in Pakistan 
and earthquake victims in Haiti constituted important 
victories for public diplomacy in hostile areas. Building 
on this goodwill through the transfer of technology, 
the Office of eDiplomacy, created in 2002 to improve 
the flow of information within the Department, 
expanded its functions to include increasing the digital 
literacy of civil society groups with offsite gatherings 
(‘TechCamps’) and local events (‘Tech@State’). One 
TechCamp in Jakarta, Indonesia brought together 50 
members of civil society to share ideas on the uses 
of information technologies for disaster response. 
 
At this point, it must be made clear that this new 
direction did more than mark a shift in institutional 
receptivity to technology. It was no small feat for an 
agency historically inclined toward secrecy to sanction 
blogging and tweeting not even six years after the staff 
of the Truman Building won public and unclassified 
access to the internet. However, the emphasis on 
the ‘tools needed to succeed’ inexorably tilted the 
balance between mastery of content and the mastery 
of types of media toward the latter. The redirection 
of ‘vision’ away from Under Secretary McHale and 
towards such figures as Slaughter, wunderkinds Alec 
Ross and Jared Cohen, and the Office of eDiplomacy 
supplied them with the clear path to innovation that 
public diplomacy so desperately needed. 
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But with so many new players involved in this new 
incarnation of public diplomacy, decentralisation of 
public diplomacy activity has been the net effect. 
There is a second, more pervasive casualty resulting 
from this approach as well: strategic incoherence. 
This would hardly be the first time the Obama 
administration fielded criticism over such a problem. 
His grand strategy perplexes. Engagement early on 
with some leaders roused fears that Europe would 
share less of the NATO burden, Russia would blithely 
antagonise neighbours to the west, and Iran would 
exploit America’s unclenched fist. A most deferential 
bow before the Saudi King Abdullah unnerved 
Americans already suspicious of Obama’s defence (not 
to mention religious) bona fides. His own handpicked 
leader of the American mission in Afghanistan, General 
Stanley McChrystal, pilloried him in the press. Contrast 
this with the forcefulness with which Obama’s cabinet 
members chastised European defence ministers over 
the Afghan mission and their successful lobby for 
‘smart’ sanctions against Iran. Obama has waged 
a more aggressive counterterrorism campaign in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan than his predecessor, and 
he shall always garner recognition for the demise of 
Osama bin Laden. But Obama’s foreign policies are 
the products of painstaking deliberation, all the while 
fueling consternation. It took nearly all of 2009 to 
articulate a vision for ‘AfPak’ to an antsy domestic 
audience as well as allies. Other more barometric 
policies, such as the administration’s positions on 
Darfur and Burma came together slowly and, in their 
absence, left concerned members of civil society to 
scrutinise America’s commitment to social justice 
and human security. Pragmatic to the last, this 
administration’s foreign policies strive for action that 
leaves them room to manoeuvre as opposed to being 
boxed in by principles. 
And yet, in many ways pragmatism is anathema to 
the integrity of official public diplomacy. Information 
is a core component of public diplomacy, and in the 
natural course of political events there are moments 
when information benefits from a singular voice 
and purpose. It is much easier to galvanise these 
by recourse to principles, and easier still when all 
agencies are working together. Two examples serve 
as proof of the undermining power of pragmatism 
where the public diplomacy of principles is concerned. 
President Obama’s speech on 4 June 2009 in Cairo 
represented his second major outreach effort to 
Muslim audiences, the first one an exclusive interview 
(and his first in office) with al-Arabiya merely days after 
his inauguration. By any measure, the speech itself 
won tremendous praise for its vision and sincerity. 
However this praise also was tempered by doubts that 
such a vision could ever be achieved, and those doubts 
turned out to be well-founded. In his speech, Obama 
sought to redress the hostile tensions of the Bush era 
with an ambitious agenda for cooperation. The top 
two priorities in this agenda undoubtedly sit at the 
forefront of Muslim concern over America’s influence 
in the Middle East: combatting violent extremism and 
resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict. Of the first, he 
assured the audience ‘…just as America can never 
tolerate violence by extremists, we must never alter 
or forget our principles… America will defend itself, 
respectful of the sovereignty of nations and the rule 
of law. And we will do so in partnership with Muslim 
communities which are also threatened’. Partnership, 
Obama discovered, would prove elusive particularly 
in Pakistan, whose sovereignty sustains repeated 
violations by American intelligence operations, special 
forces, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Recent eruptions 
of alleged terrorist activities in weak states such as 
Yemen and Somalia further illustrate the cold calculus 
of national interests versus high ideals. Hostility 
towards America in these areas, the new frontiers of 
counterterrorism, remains strong and the prospects 
for successful public diplomacy are slim. In the case of 
Israel-Palestine, post-Cairo Obama folded his principled 
stance on the expansion of Jewish settlements into the 
West Bank in the face of strong resistance by Israeli 
Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. Pragmatism 
prevailed over principle once more on the issue 
of Palestinian statehood, which Obama moved to 
obstruct when the matter came before the UN Security 
Council. In summary, the legacy of the Cairo speech 
finds its lofty shared goals at odds with America’s 
national interests, the effect of which was to diminish 
the balance in Obama’s political capital account. 
 
Secretary Clinton delivered what came to be known 
as her ‘internet freedom’ speech in January 2010, 
when tensions over censorship by Chinese authorities 
were palpable. Shortly before the speech, the internet 
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behemoth Google found itself the target of cyberattacks by Chinese authorities hacking into the e-mail 
accounts of human rights activists. When Google responded to the attacks by shutting down its Chinese 
language web portal, it brought the differences of opinion on this issue between the American and Chinese 
governments into focus. Clinton suggested that China’s ability to ‘restrict free access to information or violate 
the basic rights of internet users risk[s] walling themselves off from the progress of the next century’. Unfettered 
access to information, Clinton claimed, is ‘helping people discover new facts and making governments more 
accountable’. Beyond inciting China, the US issued a standard reflecting its embrace of open government 
and the democratisation of technology in line with the national value of free speech. By the end of that 
year, the Obama administration would find itself revisiting that standard out of line with national security. 
In late November 2010, the website Wikileaks released a trove of over a quarter-million classified diplomatic 
cables to several international newspapers. One of the newspapers to receive the cables, The Guardian, 
could not help but point out the ‘delicious irony’ of turning the Western argument for internet freedom 
against itself. The Wikileaks debacle offered a sobering reminder of internet freedom’s double-edged sword. 
It also showcased on a global stage the erosion of information control so critical to the workings of ‘closed’ 
diplomacy. Communications scholar Clay Shirky asserts this is a fait accompli of the new diplomatic landscape: 
‘The loss of control you fear is already in the past. You do not actually control the message, and if you believe 
you control the message, it merely means you no longer understand what’s going on’. 
With respect to public diplomacy, the question remains as to whether messages matter less to the Obama 
administration than the means to deliver them. No president would concede this point, and yet actions 
dictate otherwise. The absence of a strategic framework for public diplomacy is further complicated by the 
administration’s tendency to choose pragmatism over principle when exercising its foreign policies. Asked 
to explain the public diplomacy dimension of their job, most American Foreign Service officers would be 
hard pressed to say what it is, and those in the know would supply an answer involving Twitter or perhaps 
DipNote, the Department’s public blog. From this it is no wonder Obama’s foreign policy objectives cause such 
confusion. An easy suggestion would be for Obama to emulate the principled approach of his predecessor, 
whose policies, regardless of opinion, were well known. But unlike the dwindling prospects for the American 
economy and the domestic view of his performance, Obama’s political capital account abroad remains flush. 
His Transatlantic Trends’ job approval number from the 2011 survey? Seventy-five percent. Obama should 
be grateful that publics abroad appear to distinguish their admiration for him from the sustaining contempt 
they have for American foreign policies. Based on the experiences of his predecessor, it is also clear that 
communication tools cannot alone compensate for flawed strategy, especially one that is incoherent. The 
occupant of the White House has changed, but once again it is the content of American statecraft that 
undermines its public diplomacy. ■
